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Abstract 
The literature of recent UK policy toward Syria focuses on the 2013 chemical weapons crisis. We 
examine policy discourses leading up to that. The government supported the removal of Assad 
but faced the challenge of explaining how that would be realized. Given its unwillingness and 
inability to mobilise support for military intervention, or to tailor policy goals to match available 
means, government strategy arguably lacked credibility. Our purpose is to examine how the 
government tried to close this ends means gap and how, having failed to do that, its ‘discursive 
strategy’ legitimised its approach. We argue the resources for the government’s discursive strategy 
on Syria can be found in the earlier articulation of ‘liberal conservatism’. A policy that from an 
ideal-liberal or ideal-conservative position might have been criticised as half-baked was maintained 
by a strategy that gave consideration to, but did not completely follow through on, either archetype. 
Drawing on an analysis of 2152 sources and supplemented by elite interviews, we illustrate how 
this strategy managed the interplay of two basic discourses: a liberal insistence that the UK should 
support ‘the Arab Spring’ and a conservative insistence that military intervention was imprudent 
because ‘Syria was not Libya’. 
 
The International Relations (IR) literature on the response to the initial violence in Syria tends to 
concentrate mainly on legal and normative issues.2 Much of this work focuses on the failure of the 
UN Security Council to respond collectively.  Broader discussion on the foreign policies of the 
Security Council permanent members, including the UK, is underdeveloped. Indeed, academic 
discussion on UK policy toward Syria is either subsumed within analyses of the region or limited 
to a consideration of the August 2013 House of Commons vote in Parliament, which denied Prime 
Minister Cameron the political mandate to use force in response to the Ghouta chemical weapon 
                                                          
1 The research for this paper was supported by an EU Marie Curie International Outgoing Fellowship, project 
number 627740 and the RCUK ‘Rights and Ethics in a Security Context’ research programme, grant number: 
ES/L013355/1.  The authors would like to thank James Souter, Xavier Mathieu, Ben Fermor and Blake Lawrinson 
for their research assistance.  
2 For example, C. Stahn, 'Between Law-breaking and Law-making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and ‘What the 
Law Ought to Be’', Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 19 (2014), pp. 25-48; R. Thakur, 'R2P after Libya and Syria: 
Engaging Emerging Powers', The Washington Quarterly, 36 (2013), pp. 61-76; K. Kersavage, 'The “responsibility to 
protect” our answer to “never again”? Libya, Syria and a critical analysis of R2P', International Affairs Forum, 5 (2014), 
pp. 23-41; T. G. Weiss, 'Military Humanitarianism: Syria Hasn't Killed It', The Washington Quarterly, 37 (2014), pp. 7-
20; B. Momani and T. Hakak, 'Syria', in A. J. Bellamy and T. Dunne (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to 
Protect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 895-910; Odeyemi, 'Re-emerging Powers and the Impasse in the 
UNSC over R2P Intervention in Syria', Strategic Analysis, 40 (2016), pp. 122-149. 
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attack.3  In the lead up to that vote, the government supported the goal of removing the Assad 
regime but constantly faced the challenge of explaining how that goal would be realized.  Given 
its unwillingness and inability to mobilise support for military intervention (either directly as in 
Libya or indirectly by arming proxies), or to tailor policy goals to match available means, the 
government risked criticism that its approach lacked credibility.  The purpose of this paper is to 
examine how the UK government tried to close this ends-means gap and how, having failed to do 
that, it adopted a ‘discursive strategy’ to legitimise its continuing support for what in effect was 
regime change.4   
There is nothing inherently problematic about calling on Assad to go without being willing or able 
to effect it through military intervention.  It is a fundamental tenet of realist ethics, however, that 
a failure to match policy means and ends is the mark of an imprudent foreign policy.5 If it is allowed 
to persist, it can negative consequences.  Indeed, foreign policy realists have argued that the ‘Assad 
must go’ stance was imprudent.  It was not realizable, they argue, and by sticking to it western 
governments helped block United Nations efforts to negotiate what would have been a relatively 
swift end to the conflict.6  Others have argued that western powers at the Security Council let the 
perfect (political transition) be the enemy of the good (humanitarian access), and that a collective 
response demanding the latter was only achieved in 2014, after the threat of western military 
intervention had been removed.7   
                                                          
3 J. Strong, 'Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through 
Syria, Libya and Iraq', The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17 (2015), pp. 604-622; J. Strong, 
'Interpreting the Syria vote: parliament and British foreign policy', International Affairs, 91 (2015), pp. 1123–1139; J. 
Gaskarth, 'The fiasco of the 2013 Syria votes: decline and denial in British foreign policy', Journal of European Public 
Policy, 23 (2016), pp. 718-734; A. Sarvarian, 'Humanitarian intervention after Syria', Legal Studies, 36 (2016), pp. 20-47. 
J. Kaarbo and D. Kenealy, 'No, prime minister: explaining the House of Commons' vote on intervention in Syria', 
European Security, 25 (2016), p. 28.  On British foreign policy and the region during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ see P. 
Leech and J. Gaskarth, 'British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 26 (2015), pp. 139-60. 
4 On ‘discursive strategy’ see S. Kettell, 'Dilemmas of Discourse: Legitimsing Britain's War on Terror', British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations, 15 (2013), pp. 263-279. 
5 Richard Beardsworth, Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory Polity 2011, pp.48-56. 
6 S. Walt, 'Obama was not a Realist President', Foreign Policy (2016); also Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace. A 
Memor of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century  (Washington D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2015), loc.5525 
Kindle edition. 
7 J. Ralph and J. Gifkins, 'The purpose of Security Council practice. Contesting competence claims in the normative 
context created by the Responsibility to Protect', European Journal of International Relations, forthcoming (2016). 
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More specifically in the context of UK policymaking, the realist argument found expression in the 
frustration of those who complained about the ends-means gap in government strategy; something 
that emerged because of the failure to satisfactorily answer the ‘second-order questions’ about how 
to effect policy.8  Indeed, as we demonstrate in this paper, the government’s ongoing commitment 
to regime change complicated its argument for limited military action in response to the 2013 
chemical weapons attack.  In this sense, it is at least arguable that the insistence on removing Assad 
was made at the expense of other policy goals.  Historians with a normative focus will debate 
whether there was a cost, and if so, whether that was a price worth paying.  Our objective here is 
more modest.  By situating UK policy in the discursive context leading up to the 2013 vote we 
demonstrate how the UK government tried to close the gap between ends-means, and how, having 
failed to do that, it rationalized policy through a discursive strategy that drew on themes deeply 
embedded in British foreign policy culture.  
We argue that the resources for the government’s discursive strategy on Syria can be found in the 
earlier articulation of ‘liberal conservatism’, a concept that sought to transcend traditional binaries 
by accepting that British values should inform policy while acknowledging that there were limits 
to what could be done to advance them.  A policy that from an ideal-liberal or ideal-conservative 
position might have been criticised as half-baked was maintained by a liberal conservative strategy 
that gave consideration to, but did not completely follow through on, either archetype.  To 
illustrate this strategy in action, the paper discusses the interplay of two basic discourses: a liberal 
insistence that the UK should support ‘the Arab Spring’ by backing what was represented as the 
inevitable removal of Assad; and a conservative insistence that direct military intervention was not 
possible because ‘Syria was not Libya’.  We nuance this discussion with six supporting sub-
discourses, but our central argument is that the interaction of these two basic discourses articulated 
                                                          
8 See criticism of former British Chief of Defence Staff, General David Richards in A. Seldon and P. Snowden, 
Cameron at 10 : the inside story, 2010-2015 (London: William Collins, 2015) pp.327-8. 
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a middle-ground between liberalism and conservativism which sustained UK policy during this 
period.  
Following two sections that explicitly map the article’s approach, we develop this argument in 
sections that loosely reflect chronological developments prior to the August 2013 vote.  The third 
section illustrates how the insistence on regime change was squared with a policy of non-
intervention by a discursive strategy that emphasised the inevitability of Assad’s overthrow.  The 
fourth demonstrates how ‘the Arab Spring’ discourse, and the sense that the UK was on ‘the right 
side of history’, was used to marginalise the UN Security Council and legitimise alternative 
diplomatic tracks.  The fifth and sixth sections consider how the government responded to the 
radicalization of the Syrian opposition and the conservative realist argument that by working for 
the overthrow of Assad the government contradicted its counter-terrorist efforts.  In squaring this 
circle, the government adopted a Blair-like argument that removing Assad was consistent with UK 
values and in its security interests because it was the Syrian leader’s crimes that had radicalised 
western enemies.  The focus on bringing Assad to justice also enabled the government to address 
the liberal charge that western states were mere ‘bystanders’ without provoking conservative 
arguments about the costs of intervention.  
 
British foreign policy as culturally embedded discourse 
Discourse analytic research employs an array of theoretical and methodological approaches across 
a wide range of disciplines.9  In IR, studies of discourse have most frequently been associated with 
poststructural and constructivist work,10 much of it focused on US foreign policy and European 
                                                          
9 See Benjamin R. Banta, ‘Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism’, European Journal of International Relations, 19:2 
(2013), pp. 379–402.  
10 See Anna Holzscheiter, ‘Between communicative interaction and structures of signification: Discourse theory and 
analysis in International Relations’, International Studies Perspectives, 15:2 (2014), pp. 142–62. 
5 
 
integration,11 as well as critical studies of terrorism and security.12 In UK foreign policy studies 
discourse analysis has been used by Oliver Daddow on relations with Europe, Jamie Gaskarth on 
ethics, Adam Humphreys on the national interest, David McCourt, Cristian Cantir and Juliet 
Kaarbo on role conceptions and contestation, and Steven Kettell and Jack Holland on counter-
terrorism.13  UK case studies have also informed Opperman and Spencer’s project on the 
‘discursive nature of policy fiascos’.14  Likewise, Bevir, Daddow and Hall’s project on interpretivist 
approaches to foreign policy analysis situates policy agents in discursive structures that reference 
historical traditions and dilemmas as a means of legitimising or contesting current practice.15  The 
point of these studies is to explore and analyse the discursive construction of the social world by 
investigating how discourses articulate and contest socio-political reality in ways that influence 
thinking and action.16  The rise and fall of discourses helps to shape the parameters of what is 
politically possible.  Policy positions are enabled on the back of ‘successful’ discursive strategies, 
and policy choices are rendered off limits by discursive strategies that ‘fail’. Our approach builds 
on these studies in order to analyse the discursive context prior to the 2013 vote on military 
                                                          
11 E.g. Campbell, D. 1992. Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press; Diez, T. 2001. Europe as a discursive battleground discourse analysis and European integration 
studies. Cooperation and conflict. 36(1), pp.5-38;. 
12 Jackson, R. Writing the War on Terrorism, Manchester: Manchester University Press 2005; Buzan, B., Waever, O., de 
Wilde, J. (1998) Security: A Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner. 
13 O. Daddow, New Labour and the European Union : Blair and Brown's logic of history (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2011); O. Daddow, 'Constructing a ‘great’ role for Britain in an age of austerity: 
Interpreting coalition foreign policy, 2010–2015', International Relations, 29 (2015), pp. 303-318; O. Daddow, M. Bevir 
and P. Schnapper, 'Introduction: Interpreting British European Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 (2015), 
pp. 1-17; J. Gaskarth, 'Discourses and Ethics: The Social Construction of British Foreign Policy', Foreign policy 
analysis, 2 (2006), pp. 325-341; Adam R.C. Humphreys, ‘From National Interest to Global Reform: Patterns of 
Reasoning in British Foreign Policy Discourse’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 17 (2015), pp.568-84; 
D. M. McCourt, 'Rethinking Britain's Role in the World for a New Decade: The Limits of Discursive Therapy and 
the Promis of Field Theory', The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 13 (2011), pp. 145-164; S. Kettell, 
'Dilemmas of Discourse: Legitimising Britain's War on Terror', British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15 
(2013), pp. 263-279; Holland, J. ‘Blair’s War on Terror: Selling Intervention to Middle England’ British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations 14 (2012), pp.74-95. 
14 K. Oppermann and A. Spencer, 'Telling sories of failure: narrative constructions of foreign policy fiascos', Journal 
of European Public Policy, 23 (2016), pp. 685-701. 
15 M. Bevir, O. Daddow and I. Hall, 'Introduction: Interpeting British Foreign Policy', British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 15 (2013). 
16 E.g. Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing national interests’, European Journal of International Relations, 2:3 (1996), pp. 275-318. 
6 
 
intervention in Syria and to address the specific question of how the ends-means gap in UK foreign 
policy emerged at this time.   
How, then, do we understand the term ‘discourse’? While we adopt a broadly ‘Critical 
Constructivist’ understanding of discourse,17 our approach is intentionally focused on the principal 
component of British foreign policy discourse between 2011 and 2013: language. That is to say, 
we acknowledge that discourses encompass a range of important features – such as images, 
landscapes, body language etc. – but we focus on the linguistic core at the heart of British foreign 
policy discourses on Syria. Ours is an analysis focused on the written and spoken word, which 
gave shape to emergent British foreign policy discourses after 2011.  For the purpose of this article, 
discourses are identifiable where linguistic regularities create a relative predictability in meaning 
production.  The boundaries of a discourse might also mark the limits of what it is possible to say 
in a given context.  This might be seen, for example in the way that language saturates objects with 
meaning; consider, for example, that chemical weapons are ‘barbaric’ and ‘off limits’, whereas 
conventional weapons, killing vastly more people, are often considered ‘legitimate’.18 What marks 
out statements which cling (intertextually) together to form these discourses is that: (i) they are 
predictable in demonstrating a relative, if always impermanent, fixity in meaning production; (ii) 
they are reasonably widespread, demonstrating a degree of resonance, repetition and amplification 
across society; and (iii) arguing otherwise becomes reasonably challenging, or even impossible, at 
least from within the (porous) borders of the discourse itself.  
For political elites, of course, the creation of resonant discourses is vitally important. The 
etymological proximity of the verb ‘to legislate’ and the adjective ‘legitimate’ is not coincidental; 
electoral victory is insufficient to govern without consideration of the will of the public.19 Political 
                                                          
17 Informed broadly by the Minnesota School, including the likes of Jutta Weldes, Roxanne Doty, Mark Laffey, 
Raymond Duvall among others. 
18 Bentley, M. Exploiting the Forbidden, Routledge 2016. 
19 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘International Crises of Legitimacy’, International Politics 44 (2007) p.157.  
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elites actively seek legitimacy – including in the realm of foreign policy.20 Yet the boundaries of a 
discourse depend on its interactions with competing discourses - it is both challenged by and reliant 
on other discourses for legitimising its meanings.21 This continuous process of strategic agency 
and discursive struggle is, in effect, a battle to control meaning, and define events and identities, 
in order to enable, shape and constrain policy outcomes.22 Our article therefore draws on the 
insights of seminal constructivists such as Doty and Weldes, in recognising that, in establishing the 
context of politics and policy, discourses deﬁne the (im)possible and the (im)probable; they shape 
understandings of what is natural and normal, and even what is to be counted as a problem in the 
first place.23 Understanding policy outcomes – and in this instance a policy gap – requires an 
analysis of the discursive context that enables, inspires and guides them. 
Where then do discourses come from? And how do they rise and fall, win and lose? Following 
Bevir, Daddow and Hall, Holland and others working outside IR, our approach views discourse 
as culturally embedded.24 Longstanding foreign policy traditions comprise a British foreign policy 
culture.25 British foreign policy discourses are embedded within this cultural landscape in two 
senses. They are drawn from, and usually framed to mesh with, this specific domestic context.26 A 
sense of elite agency is, therefore, at the forefront of our approach, as is the importance of crafting 
                                                          
20 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 1; Hansen, L. Security as practice: discourse analysis and the Bosnian war, London: 
Routledge, 2006, 7; Western, J., 'The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public', Security Studies, 14:1, (2005), 
107; Holland, ‘Blair’s War on Terror’. 
21 Doty, R.L Imperial encounters: the politics of representation in North-South relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996), p. 6. 
22 On the importance of strategic agency and intentionality, see Miskimmon, A. O’Loughlin, B. and Roselle, L. 
Strategic narratives: Communication, power and the new world order, Routledge 2013. 
23 Doty, R.L. 1993. Foreign policy as social construction: A post-positivist analysis of US counterinsurgency policy 
in the Philippines. International studies quarterly. pp.297-320; Weldes, J. 1996. Constructing national interests. European 
Journal of International Relations. 2(3), pp.275-318. 
24; Bevir, et al ‘Introduction’; Holland, Selling the War on Terror; Toal, G., Dalby, S., and Routledge, P. The Geopolitics 
Reader. (London: Routledge, 2006), p.8;  
25 Bevir, et al.  ‘Introduction’.  J. Gaskarth, 'Interpreting Ethical Foreign Policy: Traditions and Dilemmas for 
Policymakers', The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 15 (2013), pp. 192-209. 
26 Bevir, et al, ‘Introduction’.  See also Holland, J. ‘Foreign policy and political possibility’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 19:1 (2013), pp. 49–68; and, for discussion of foreign policy as culturally embedded discourse, 
see chapters 1 and 2 (and particularly pages 41-45) of Holland, Selling the War on Terror. 
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resonant discourses.27 This might be achieved through appeals to extant identities and widely-held 
values, or logical, emotive, or populist language. Tony Blair, for example, excelled in crafting a 
resonant foreign policy discourse, which drew on powerful images of a great nation, with a long 
history of global leadership, balanced by appeals to common sense that combined both morality 
and interest.28   
In order to explore the discursive context of the 2013 vote we analysed the statements on Syria of 
political and media elites, the principal contributors to Britain’s discursive context in the lead up 
to the 2013 debate.  Government statements were analysed for patterns that indicated the presence 
of strategies to defend policy position.  Those of opposition political parties were analysed in 
addition to newspaper articles, including reporting and editorial/comment pieces, to identify the 
discursive context in which policy was being created and sold.  This model enables an analysis of 
the arena of wider foreign policy debate, exploring the (potential) hegemonic position enjoyed by 
a government, or the scope for contestation and evolution in discourse and policy.29 As Hansen 
notes, a focus on the media, alongside the debates of political elites, enables a deeper analysis, 
responsive to those moments when a government position does not respond adequately or fully 
to the discursive context.30 We gathered qualitative data for this analysis using the terms ‘Syria 
AND Intervention’ to filter a Lexis-Nexis search of ‘all UK newspapers’ from March 2011 to 
August 2013, Hansard and government websites.  This led to an analysis of 2152 sources.31  NVivo 
software was used to organise this data around specific ‘nodes’, which helped to map the discursive 
landscape between 2011 and 2013. A combination of inductive and deductive analysis was used to 
                                                          
27 Bevir, et al ‘Introduction’; Hay, C. 'Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the `Winter of Discontent'', 
Sociology, 30:2, (1996), pp.253-277; Hay, C. 'Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the 
Process of Change', British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 1:3, (1999), pp.317-344. 
28 Holland, ‘Blair’s War on Terror’; J. Gilmore, 'The uncertain merger of values and interests in UK foreign policy', 
International Affairs, 90 (2014), pp. 541-557.  
29 Hansen, Security as practice, pp. 54-55. 
30 Hansen, Security as practice, p. 55. 
31 Limited space means we cite indicative sources. Additional sources are listed in the appendix. 
9 
 
identify the basic discourses;32 the latter guided  by semi-structured interviews of 18 diplomats (not 
all UK) serving on the Security Council, as well as the secondary literature on British foreign policy 
discourse, culture and national identity.  
 
Establishing the discursive context of British foreign policy 
In our analysis the historical and cultural background to UK foreign policy is structured by two 
traditions identified by Bevir, Daddow and Hall.  The first is a liberal/socialist tradition, which 
privileges cosmopolitan responsibilities as integral to the national interest. The second is a 
conservative/whiggish tradition, which is suspicious of moralism and emphasises the need for 
scepticism and prudence in the service of the national interest and international order.33 Emerging 
from these traditions are what we call, following Lene Hansen, two ‘basic discourses’.  These act 
as the ‘the main convectors of discussion’ or ‘the key points of structuring disagreement within a 
debate’ on - in our case - Syria.34  The remainder of this section describes these specific discourses 
in their ‘ideal type’ format.35  Table 1 summarises the discussion. 
Table 1: Culturally Embedded British Foreign Policy Discourses towards Syria (2011-13) 
Traditions within 
British foreign 
policy culture 
Liberal / Socialist internationalism 
 
Substrands include: Ethical foreign 
policy; Neoconservative/Offensive 
liberalism36 
Conservative / Whiggish realism 
 
Substrands include:  Suspicion of 
revolution; Realpolitik; English 
School Pluralism37 
                                                          
32 Throughout the data analysis, regular meetings and overview within the small research team were coupled to 
random cross-check sampling of coding to ensure inter-coder reliability.  
33 Bevir et al, ‘Introduction’. 
34 L. Hansen, Security as practice, pp. 95, 52. 
35 Also on the use of ‘ideal-types’ see Humphreys, ‘From National Interest’. 
36 J. Ralph, 'The liberal state in international society: Interpreting recent British foreign policy', International Relations, 
28 (2014), pp. 3-24.; Gilmore, 'The uncertain merger of values and interests’. 
37 Hall and Rengger, ‘The Right That Failed?’ 
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Basic discourse on 
Syria 
“Arab Spring” “Syria is not Libya” 
Sub- discourses Active / 
Gladstonian 
foreign 
policy 
R2P/ICC Support 
US on 
the right 
side of 
history 
Syria 
is 
Iraq 
Syria is 
War on 
Terror 
Relative strength 
of Assad in 
comparison to 
opposition 
Policy implication:  Assad must go, including direct/ 
indirect military/non-military 
intervention to that end. 
 
Second-order questions: Match 
means to ends; or compromise on 
policy goals to achieve outcomes 
short of regime change. 
 
 
 
Interpreted from within the liberal internationalist tradition, the early protests against the Assad 
regime were something the UK should support, especially because they were part of the historic 
movement sweeping the Arab world toward democracy.  We recognise that as a description of the 
various revolutions happening at the time, the term ‘Arab Spring’ does not adequately capture the 
plurality of experiences.  We also recognise that the UK response to each of these experiences was 
different, a point we return to in the conclusion.38  We think it is an appropriate label to describe 
our first basic discourse on Syria, however, because it captures the sense in which British 
policymakers accepted regime change as inevitable and legitimized a strategy of calling for Assad 
to go by appealing (at least initially) to a sense that events in Syria were part of a larger movement 
of history.  We find a number of sub-discourses informing and helping to underpin this discursive 
                                                          
38 Leech and Gaskarth, 'British Foreign Policy’. 
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strategy.  These included the sense that calling for Assad to go was morally and legally the right 
thing to do in the context of international norms such as the responsibility to protect populations 
from crimes against humanity and to prosecute the perpetrators.  It was also represented as being 
consistent with a “Gladstonian” identity that portrayed the UK as an active and influential leader 
of the kind of progressive change these norms symbolized. 
Interpreted from within the conservative realist tradition the violence in Syria looked very 
different.  As Hall and Rengger note, political conservativism as a foreign policy tradition is 
traceable to Edmund Burke’s reaction to the French Revolution and his scepticism toward the 
liberal idea that reason was powerful enough to create new social orders.  Change from this 
perspective was not always ‘salutary reform’.  If change had to happen it ‘must do so prudently’ 
without disrupting those structures that maintained order.  Prudence, from this perspective, is the 
statesman’s chief virtue.39  This tends to make conservatives (but not neoconservatives) realists; 
although realists are not necessarily conservatives in the broader sense of the term.40 We call the 
basic discourse that resonated most with this tradition ‘Syria is not Libya’.  This reflected a sense 
that the military intervention the UK had committed to in Libya could not be repeated in Syria 
because the situation was different in ways that made the use of force imprudent.  A number of 
sub-discourses reinforced this basic point: an extension of metaphorical reasoning which implied 
that if ‘Syria’ was not ‘Libya’ (a policy success, at least initially) it was probably ‘Iraq’ (a failure not 
to be repeated);41 or, given the changing character of the opposition, ‘Syria’ was ‘the new front 
against al Qaeda’.  Another sub-discourse emphasised the continuing strength and resilience of the 
Assad regime in comparison to the opposition. In this situation, an ideal-type conservative realist 
                                                          
39 Hall and Rengger, ‘The Right That Failed?’ 
40 Hall and Rengger, ‘The Right That Failed?’ p.73. 
41 On metaphorical reasoning see A. Spencer, 'The Governance of Counter-Terrorism and the Constitution of 
Threat in Britain', in K. Oppermann (ed.) British Foreign and Security Policy (Augsberg: Wissner-Verlag, 2012), pp. 208-
228. 
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could have drawn on Burkean-type scepticism and appeals to the national interest to argue against 
the liberal commitment to democratization.   
It is our finding that the government was neither willing nor able to argue for an ideal-type 
conservative position; but at the same time it was neither willing nor able to follow through on the 
ideal-type liberal position by effecting regime change through military intervention.42  In this 
respect, there is a synergy between the government’s approach to Syria and the vision of liberal 
conservatism that David Cameron set out in his JP Morgan lecture on 11 September 2006.  There 
he described himself as ‘Liberal - because I support the aim of spreading freedom and democracy, 
and support humanitarian intervention. Conservative - because I recognise the complexities of 
human nature, and am sceptical of grand schemes to remake the world’.43  Syria tested his 
government’s ability to balance these instincts and to sell the resultant policy to various 
constituencies.  We argue, however, that the government was able to pursue a strategy that 
legitimized a position between the ideal-liberal and ideal-conservative types.  Positions that, from 
an ideal-type perspective, were ‘empty’ because ‘they lack relevant ends-means reasoning’,44 were 
nevertheless legitimised, at least to the extent that the government could maintain that Assad must 
go without committing the means to effect that.   
 
‘The Arab Spring’ and ‘Syria is not Libya’: Two basic discourses 
In March 2011 Syrian protesters began calling for a lifting of the 48 year emergency law – which 
enabled the state to outlaw public gatherings.  Hope that the regime would avoid violence by 
                                                          
42 Here, we note that such a situation was not unique to the Cameron Government; rather, tensions between 
competing UK foreign policy traditions and the discourses they inspire is a longstanding feature of British and other 
governments.  
43 David Cameron.  Annual JP Morgan Speech, British-American Project, 11 September 2006.  Also David 
Cameron’s address to the UN General Assembly. 26 September 2012. See Matt beech, ‘British Conservatism and 
Foreign Policy: Traditions and Ideas Shaping Cameron’s Global View’, British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 13 (2011), 348-63; Victoria Honeyman, ‘Liberal Conservatism and Foreign Policy’ in Opperman, pp.130-46; 
Daddow, 'Constructing a ‘great’ role’.  
44 Humphreys, ‘From National Interest’, p.570. 
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reforming were short lived.  In August of 2011, following developments in the Arab League which 
saw Qatar and Saudi Arabia call for Assad to go and attacks against US Ambassador Ford who 
had indicated support for opposition groups, the US called on Assad to step aside.45   With the US 
taking such a lead it would have been difficult for the UK not to follow.  Our interview data, 
however, suggests that UK policy, at least at the United Nations in New York, was out in front of 
American thinking and the government in London did not hesitate in calling for Assad to go.46  As 
one well-placed diplomat put it to us, the UK came out of the Libya experience ‘thinking it had 
been a good exercise’ and that on Syria they actively tried to convince the US ‘to push the 
boundaries’ of its policy.47  Of significance for us is how discursively the government defended the 
insistence that Assad must go in the context of these ‘boundaries’, which in the period under 
consideration limited US intervention to the supply of non-lethal aid.  Crucial to this strategy, at 
least in the initial phases of the crisis, was the representation of the violence in Syria as part of the 
historic and unstoppable movement toward democracy known as ‘the Arab Spring’. 
To repeat the above qualification, we are not claiming here that the UK had a consistent approach 
to all the events labelled as part of the Arab Spring.  As Leech and Gaskarth note the UK response 
to the violence in Bahrain for example was less damning and they explain that in terms of elite 
networks.48  We do note, however, that Assad’s repression in Syria was discursively linked to events 
in Libya and ‘the tide’49 or ‘wave’ of demand for change in the Arab World.50  David Cameron for 
instance, noted that ‘what is happening in what I call the Arab Spring is that leaders have to show 
they have the consent of the people […] and President Assad is not doing that’.51  Likewise, Deputy 
                                                          
45 David Usborne, Oliver Wright, and Khalid Ali. ‘Obama leads diplomatic push against Assad regime’, 
Independent.co.uk. August 19, 2011. 
46 Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, Speech on the Arab Spring delivered at the British Council in London on 22 
August 2011. 
47 Author Interview with UK diplomat December 2015. 
48 Leech and Gaskarth, 'British Foreign Policy’. 
49 Announcement. Foreign Secretary pledges continued support for Syrian people. The FCO and Hague, 16 
September 2011. 
50 Announcement. Foreign Secretary  Hague updates Parliament on Middle East and North Africa  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 26 April 2011. 
51 Transcript of interview during visit to Saudi Arabia. Cabinet Office and David Cameron 13 January 2012. 
14 
 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg insisted that ‘[Assad] is as irrelevant to Syria’s future as Qadhafi is to 
Libya’s’.52 More than that, this linkage represented Assad’s attempts to hold on to power as 
destined to fail.  Liberal values, according to Foreign and Commonwealth Minister, Alistair Burt 
MP, ‘spread by themselves over time – not because Western nations are advocating them, but 
because they are the natural aspirations of all people everywhere. … Governments that set their 
face against reform altogether–as Libya has done and Syria seems to be – are doomed to failure’.53   
Of course, this language can be interpreted as an attempt to deter Assad and to encourage peaceful 
reform, although its usefulness was bound to be questioned in the context of statements ruling 
out military intervention.54 Still, invoking the Arab Spring to argue Assad’s departure was inevitable 
helped legitimise the call for him to go even in that context.  In the August 2011 speech that called 
on Assad to go, for instance, the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg described the Assad regime 
as ‘a single family continu[ing] to wage war on an entire nation’.  He accepted that regional 
experiences varied but insisted that ‘[t]he direction of travel is set. The fundamental forces driving 
these changes are here to stay’.55 Likewise, Foreign Secretary William Hague described the Arab 
Spring as more important for the 21st century than 9/11.  He insisted Assad had taken the ‘wrong 
route’ and that it was ‘just a matter of time’ before he was replaced.56 This sense of inevitability 
was repeated in March 2012 when, following the withdrawal of British diplomats from Damascus, 
the Foreign Office announced Ambassador Collis’s view that the regime would not last another 
year.57   
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Constructing Assad’s downfall as inevitable in this way was important because it enabled the 
government to avoid answering the awkward questions about intervention.  In certain respects, 
‘liberal conservatism’ had prepared this discursive terrain.  It appealed to ‘humility and patience’ 
because according to Cameron it understood the limits of western military power and recognised 
‘that democracy cannot quickly be imposed from outside’.58 When Cameron introduced the idea 
in 2006 it had resonated with the widespread concern about being dragged into another Iraq-type 
scenario, something the government had explicitly addressed with respect to the Libya intervention 
by ruling out ground forces.  Defending the decision to rule out military intervention in Syria was 
therefore consistent with its own narrative and a relatively easy sell.  By consistently arguing that 
‘Syria is not Libya’ (Kim Sengupta called it ‘a government mantra’)59 official discourse could 
maintain a principled commitment to liberal interventionism while demonstrating a conservative 
realist sensitivity to situational difference and the need for prudence.60 Furthermore, this discourse 
found widespread support in non-official discourse, even after the successful overthrow of 
Gaddafi.61  This support included statements by the Labour Party foreign affairs spokespersons.62      
If the ‘Syria is not Libya’ discourse helped explain why the government was not trying to remove 
Assad through direct military intervention it did not guarantee policy coherence.  The second order 
question of how to realize regime change if Assad did not fall remained a possibility. That 
potentially created a ‘plausibility gap’ in the government’s discursive strategy.  In these early stages, 
however, this was not a problem because the official ‘Arab Spring’ discourse also found support 
within the wider debate.  Syria’s suspension from the Arab League in November 2011, for instance, 
was portrayed as a ‘humiliation’63 for an ‘ailing regime’ that was ‘losing touch with reality’64 and 
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entering ‘cardiac arrest’.65  Likewise The Times seemingly echoed the Foreign Office’s assumption 
that Assad’s downfall was a matter of time.  ‘The longer Mr Assad remains’, it editorialised, ‘the 
greater the risk that the eventual reckoning for his regime will be terrible’.66  The withdrawal of 
western Ambassadors was represented as ‘cranking up the pressure’ on a ‘doomed’ regime.67  The 
‘noose’ was said to be tightening around Assad’s neck’.68  His ‘grip was weakening’.69  His ‘days 
were numbered’.70 The regime was ‘doomed’, ‘on its last legs’, ‘rotting from inside’.71  Reinforcing 
this assessment was the insistence that Assad became weaker as the death toll increased.  Assad 
was portrayed as ‘having stepped in blood so far he could not turn back’ and, like Macbeth, his 
downfall was inextricably sealed.72 
The significance of this non-official discourse then is that it facilitated the government’s claim to 
be meeting the challenge of the moment, which was regularly equated with historic events like the 
end of slavery, the Cold War and apartheid.73 A discourse that framed the violence in Syria as a 
prelude to Assad’s downfall enabled the government to legitimize the call for Assad to go despite 
acknowledging the lack of capacity to influence events through military intervention.  Furthermore, 
it enabled the government to defend its preferred conception of British identity by acting within 
liberal tradition without having to answer, at least initially, the conservative realist’s second order 
questions of what to do if Assad should stay.  Thus, Hague perpetuated a liberal sub-discourse (see 
Table 1) that framed support for the Syrian opposition in terms of a ‘Gladstonian love of freedom’.   
This, he insisted, ‘must always animate British foreign policy, even if it is not and never will be the 
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only consideration’; and it allowed him to merge these values with UK interests.  Even while ruling 
out a Libya-like intervention, Hague insisted it would be a ‘fundamental strategic error for Britain 
to sit on the sidelines.’  It was ‘strongly in our national interest’ that the peoples of the Middle East 
aspirations for political and economic freedom were fulfilled.74  
 
The right and wrong sides of history: Marginalising Russia and the UN 
 
A significant aspect of the ‘Syria is not Libya (it could be Iraq)’ discourse was the failure to unite 
the UN Security Council.  Of course, the UK government insisted that the resolutions it proposed 
on Syria were not seeking authorization for a Libya-like military intervention, and that the Russian 
and Chinese were being disingenuous to make such claims.75 In terms of the domestic discursive 
context, however, a divided Security Council resonated with memories of the 2003 decision to 
invade Iraq and this reinforced existing opposition to the idea of military intervention in Syria.76  
The 3 Russian and Chinese double vetoes during this period (October 2011, February 2012 and 
July 2012) are particularly interesting for our purposes, however, because of the way their 
discursive strategy resonated with a conservative realist suspicion of revolutionary change.  For 
instance, the Russian Ambassador to the UN regretted what he saw as the West’s eagerness to 
embrace the opposition and ‘a lack of an appeal to them to distance themselves from extremists’. 
Undermining Assad he warned ‘could trigger a full-fledged conflict in Syria and destabilization of 
the region as a whole’.77 From this perspective, the West’s policy on Libya was irresponsible not 
only because it had gone beyond the Security Council mandate agreed in Resolution 1973.  Its 
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irresponsibility lay in a substantive commitment to revolutionary change.  The vetoes were against 
the idea of regime change even without military intervention.  To legitimate its position, the UK 
government had to discursively counter or marginalise this argument.  
 
Before demonstrating how it did that it is important to offer some context.  Alongside their vetoes, 
the Russians and Chinese advocated an international response that tried to end the conflict without 
regime change.  For instance, they supported the appointment of the joint UN-Arab League peace 
negotiator, former Secretary General Kofi Annan.  The hope was that Annan could persuade the 
regime and the opposition, which had loosely coalesced under the Syrian National Council (SNC) 
to accept his six point plan.  However, western powers, including the UK, stressed that among 
these six points references to ‘political transition’ meant a national government that was ‘inclusive 
and democratic for all Syrians’ and did not include Assad.78  The additional difficulty for Annan 
was that the Arab League was also calling for Assad to be removed.  This made negotiations 
extremely difficult and it risked the implementation of Annan’s other points, such as the 
withdrawal of heavy weaponry.  As UN mediator Jean-Marie Guéhenno puts it: ‘How could a 
mediator mediate if one of the organizations on behalf of which he was working has clearly sided 
with one of the parties’. 79  Prejudging the outcome of a political transition, moreover, made it less 
likely that the process would ever get started.  However, having backed the SNC, which refused 
to talk to Assad, western powers including the UK could only accept a plan that delivered regime 
change.  This argument was also used to oppose Iranian inclusion in the talks.80  Annan had 
considered this necessary given Iran’s supposed leverage over the Syrian regime.81 As Guéhenno 
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put it: ‘for some countries, the fall of Assad would prove to be a much more important goal than 
a quick end of the war’. 82 
 
The UN-Arab League mediation efforts concluded in the period under consideration with a 
diplomatic fudge.  This insisted that a transitional government would be formed by ‘mutual 
consent’.83  When the western powers insisted that meant regime change because the SNC would 
not consent to a regime that included Assad, and when they proposed supporting that 
interpretation with a Chapter 7 Security Council Resolution, the Russians complained that the UN 
was once more being ‘blackmailed’.84   In July, Russia was again joined by China in vetoing the 
proposed resolution.  Ultimately, Annan resigned after the collapse of the UN-observed ceasefires 
complaining that Security Council division made his task impossible.85  While official UK discourse 
regretted his resignation, a significant part of the wider discourse welcomed it.  Annan and his plan 
were represented by some as simply giving the Assad regime cover to continue its brutal 
repression.86  Indeed, this was the charge the UK government directed at Russia in particular.  
Helped by the Arab Spring discourse, which insisted on the inevitability of Assad’s downfall, 
western government legitimised what happened at the UN by arguing Russia was on the wrong 
side of history.87  Its veto was a ‘mistake’88 and would be something to ‘regret’.89   
 
More than that, Russian actions were framed as shameful because they were deemed to be 
motivated by a particularly narrow view of the national interest and not value-driven; or at least 
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driven by values that enabled  Russia to benefit at the expense of the Syrian people. Cameron 
argued that supporting Assad was not in Russia’s interests.90  They should, he insisted, take a good 
‘look at their conscience’.91  This discursive strategy was a relatively easy sell in a national discursive 
context that was especially critical of Putin.  He was portrayed as a ‘hard-nosed unsentimental 
calculator of national advantage’ and his Syria policy was interpreted mainly as a defence of Russia’s 
material interests (e.g. arms sales, military bases).92  He had displayed ‘monstrous hypocrisy’ 
through a policy that was ‘shamefully disingenuous’ and ‘dismayingly reactionary’.93 Likewise, 
China’s position was represented as being driven by a dutiful commitment to Russia and their 
strategic alliance.94  This othering of Russia and China helped reaffirm the Gladstonian sub-
discourse (see Table 1) that ‘Britain had no special interests which ran counter to those of the rest 
of mankind’.95     
 
 
Finding the means 
 
As the violence escalated through 2012, critics attacked the inexorable teleology of ‘the Arab 
Spring’ discourse that underpinned the government’s discursive strategy.  For instance, following 
the May 2012 massacre of 108 civilians (nearly half of them children) in the village of Houla, Martin 
Fletcher wrote that ‘certain truths have become self-evident’. The Assad regime in his view was 
‘impervious to diplomatic or economic pressure’.  Fletcher feared the western response was simply 
more ‘rhetoric’.96  In this sense, the government’s discursive strategy of marginalising the Russian 
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position may have found support in non-official UK discourses but it was not without its critics.  
For some, the government’s ‘rhetoric’ on Russia was a convenient ‘alibi’ for western inaction.97  
This illustrates the weaknesses in the government’s discursive strategy.  Relying on the ‘Arab 
Spring’ or ‘right side of history’ discourse risked perpetuating a ‘plausibility gap’, which Kettell 
describes as a disjuncture ‘between the explanatory power of the projected discourse and the “real” 
situation …. “on the ground”.’98 The discursive resources in ‘liberal conservatism’ were stretched 
at this point and the tensions implicit in that concept were being exposed.  The government had 
demonstrated conservative ‘humility’ by accepting the limits of direct intervention, but not enough 
to accept ‘that Russia may be right’ or to let it lead the UN process.99  It instead relied on the 
liberal’s ‘faith’ in democratic progress and the conservative’s predilection for ‘patience’,100 but both 
were tested by the rising violence.  
 
A sub-discourse that emphasised Assad’s relative strength (see Table 1) also challenged the 
government’s claim to be resisting ‘strategic shrinkage’101 by maintaining the activity of a global 
power.  To counter this, and to address the emerging plausibility gap, official discourse would 
represent the UK as leading the efforts to support the Syrian opposition.  The UN Security Council 
may have been unable to act but the UK would not, as Hague put it, ‘sit on the sidelines’.102 Talks 
with the Syrian opposition began in November 2011 following the creation of the Turkish-based 
umbrella organisation, the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which 
had been created by defectors from the Syrian Army.103  Despite concerns that this opposition 
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was not as significant as their counterparts in Libya, Western powers supported the creation of an 
international support group on the model of the Libya Contact Group.  The so-called ‘Friends of 
Syria’ was a group of over 60 states that first met with the SNC in Tunis in February 2012.  Creating 
this ad hoc group outside formal UN processes was of course another part of the western strategy 
to marginalise Russia, which was not represented at these meetings.104  But the UK government 
also seized on this development as part of its discursive strategy to legitimise its support for regime 
change and its claim to be doing something to realize it.  The UK was to play ‘a very active role’ 
in the new group.105  It was represented in official discourse as ‘a driving force’.106   
 
This position found some support in non-official discourse.107 It was not without its critics 
however.  It sat awkwardly alongside reporting that questioned the coherence and, in some cases, 
the legitimacy of the opposition groups, especially those based in Turkey.108  Of course, the official 
response stressed UK efforts to address this problem by working to help unite disparate groups.109  
Yet doubts about whether that was possible were difficult to silence.  A year on from the creation 
of the SNC, for instance, the US called for greater unity among opposition groups.110 Indeed, the 
White House in particular had concerns and we know from insider accounts that this prevented 
the UK from acting to close the ends-means gap by arming the FSA.  In February 2012, for 
instance, Downing Street decided not to send arms.  The Chief of the Military Staff, General David 
Richards, was reportedly told by Hugh Powell, the Deputy National Security Adviser, that the 
plans were ‘more than the market could bear’.  They were unsellable in Washington, as well as 
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contrary to parliamentary and public opinion.111  This was confirmed later in the year when 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton teamed up with CIA Director David Petraeus to convince the 
White House to arm the Syrian opposition.  The President rejected the plan.  Clinton writes in her 
memoirs that the President required more time ‘to evaluate the Syrian opposition’ before escalating 
the US commitment.112  
 
UK support for the Syrian opposition was thus limited to non-lethal equipment, which left the 
government again exposed to a plausibility gap.113  In that context, a renewed push to coordinate 
and arm opposition groups began immediately after the November 2012 US Presidential election.  
The timing suggests that for the UK government the White House was the most significant 
audience, although it was not clear that the elections had changed US attitudes.114  For the Prime 
Minister, arming the moderate opposition would assist political transition by showing that ‘we are 
working with a credible and strengthening and growing force’.115  Yet through 2012 a sub-discourse 
that insisted Syria was in fact a new front in the war on terror (see Table 1) and not the Arab Spring 
emerged in the UK media.   This view had limited exposure in 2011 and, as noted, its association 
with Russia made it easy to dismiss.  Even without that association, there were those who argued 
the Syrian opposition were ‘extraordinary patriots’116 and the idea that they could be terrorists was 
rejected as ‘laughable’.117  From December 2011, however, reports of ‘Al-Qaida type attacks’ 
increased, something that official discourse accepted in June 2012.118  At no point, however, did 
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the UK government consider adopting an ideal-type conservative realist position that saw Assad 
as a lesser evil and a tacit ally in the war on terror.   
 
Indeed the government responded to ‘the Syria is the war on terror’ sub-discourse by defending 
its position with a Blair-like merger of values and interests.119  In arguing for the European Union 
arms embargo to be lifted for instance David Cameron argued that that the rise of al-Qaeda in 
Syria represented a "strategic imperative" for the West to arm the Syrian opposition to ensure a 
broad-based coalition topples President Bashar al-Assad.120  This initiative was again accompanied 
by a discourse asserting UK activity.  The UK was portrayed as ‘taking the lead’, ‘forcing the pace’ 
and ‘out in front’ on the question of creating a united opposition that could be armed.121 This 
strategy was only half successful, however. The arms embargo was lifted but no arms were supplied 
at that time.  As insider interview data attests, the task of selling the policy was made more difficult 
by the discourse of moral equivalence that strengthened after the media reported in May 2013 on 
images of an opposition soldier eating the heart of a Syrian soldier.122 Still, even while official 
discourse recognised ‘that there are extremists among the Opposition’, it worked to counteract the 
implication that Assad was a tacit ally. There were, the Prime Minister insisted ‘millions of ordinary 
Syrians who want to take control of their own future – a future without Assad’.123  
 
There is an irony implicit in the way we have structured our analysis of the discursive context.  The 
sub-discourse on the incoherence and changing character of the Syria opposition reinforced the 
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idea that ‘Syria was not Libya’ (see Table 1) and made it difficult for the UK government to argue 
for military intervention of any kind.  But in the aftermath of regime change in Libya there also 
emerged a discourse that suggested Libya was not an example of the UK saving the Arab Spring.124  
‘Libya’ was instead framed by some as a political vacuum in which al Qaeda thrived.  This argument 
resonated especially well after al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 11 September 2012 attack 
against the American Embassy in Benghazi.125  ‘Regime change’ in this sense was easily represented 
as counterproductive, especially when it was linked to a UK failure to commit to rebuilding.126  
With the rise of anti—Western extremism in states where the UK had overthrown regimes (e.g. 
Iraq, Libya), arguing that there was a merger of western values and interests became more difficult.  
The difficulties in Libya also helped to further undermine the Arab Spring discourse.  The events 
in Benghazi were used to portray the Arab Spring as ‘phoney’ and ‘doomed to failure’.127  It was 
an example of ‘blowback’ against western intervention.  The implication from this growing 
discourse was clear.  Trying to depose Assad would achieve nothing other than playing into the 
hands of the UK enemies.  By the end of 2012 then, ‘Libya’ had a different, although still contested, 
meaning for the debate on Syria.  Even if ‘Syria’ was ‘Libya’, it would be reason to oppose military 
intervention and regime change. 
 
 
Maintaining the merger of values and interests 
 
If the presence of al Qaeda in the discourses on Syria complicated the government’s discursive 
strategy it did not fundamentally change it.  The government remained committed to the argument 
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that the removal of Assad was the right thing to do in terms of its values and its interests, including 
the fight against al Qaeda.  Indeed, from the start of the democratic protests in 2011, ‘the Arab 
Spring’ was discursively linked to the war on terror in ways that tried to silence the ideal 
conservative-realist argument about the tension between democracy promotion and national 
security.  Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt, for instance, linked the Arab revolutions and the 
death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 to reinforce the right side of history sub-discourse.  Those 
‘who argued that 9/11 and Al Qaeda’s narrative of despair was the authentic expression of Muslim 
grievances were thankfully all too wrong’.128 Likewise, William Hague argued that in the Arab 
Spring there was ‘the seed of Al Qaeda’s long-term defeat and irrelevance.’129  The implication was 
that supporting opposition movements, at least in Libya and Syria, was not only right in terms of 
British values, it was right in terms of the ongoing war on terror.   As Cameron put it: ‘democracy 
and open societies are not the problem’; tolerating dictators in the name of stability was.  
Democracy gave the people a choice ‘between dictatorship or extremism’.130  In merging interests 
and values this way, the government’s discursive strategy on Syria marked a clear continuity with 
‘Blairite’ foreign policies.  Indeed, the government’s discursive strategy found support on the 
opposition benches for this reason.  Former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, for instance, linked the 
Arab Spring to the war on terror, arguing that what was happening in the Arab world had shown 
that al Qaeda had failed.131   
 
As noted, the argument that history was moving in a particular direction and that extremism was 
being defeated was challenged by the sub-discourses emerging in 2012.  It is clear, however, that 
the discursive context was structured by another significant sub-discourse that has not yet been 
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discussed.  This emerged from within the liberal tradition and made it difficult to consider an ideal-
type conservative realist policy.  What Table 1 refers to as the ‘R2P/ICC’ sub-discourse appealed 
to those international norms that insist states have a responsibility to intervene to protect 
populations from governments that have manifestly failed to stop atrocity crimes.  The significance 
of this sub-discourse increased in November 2011 when the UN agencies accused the regime of 
committing crimes against humanity.132  From that moment on there was a constant risk of the 
UK and other states being painted as ‘bystanders’ whose ‘dithering … played into Assad’s hands’.133 
The comparisons to the atrocities in Bosnia, which official discourse did not deny, were particularly 
challenging to a liberal conservative government.134  This is because that idea had not only been a 
response to what had been painted as the imprudent liberalism of the Blair years.  It was also a 
response to the hyper-realism of John Major and the argument that by failing to stop genocide in 
the Balkans his Conservative government had presided over Britain’s ‘unfinest hour’.135   
 
To counteract the ‘bystander’ identity, official discourse stressed the UK’s status ‘as one of the 
most active [countries] in the world when it comes to promoting human rights’.136  Preventing the 
loss of life in Syria meant stepping up support to the opposition, ‘thereby increasing the pressure 
on the regime’.137  Through its non-lethal aid to the Syrian opposition, the UK would support 
groups that would collect evidence so that ‘a day of reckoning for Assad’s crimes’ was 
guaranteed.138 Indeed, from April 2012 Hague spoke openly about the possibility of a Security 
Council resolution to refer the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and in 
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January 2013 the UK joined 57 states in petitioning the Security Council.139  Again this served two 
purposes.  It formed part of a coercive strategy to deter the regime, although this too lacked 
credibility to the extent that the Russian and Chinese had demonstrated a willingness to veto these 
kinds of Security Council resolutions. The second purpose was to reinforce the claim that the UK 
was exploring every avenue possible in its efforts to support the Syrian people overthrow the 
regime.  Official discourse emphasised how the UK ‘led the way’140 in calling on international 
community to ‘end this culture of impunity and hold to account those responsible’ for the 
atrocities.141 Part of this strategy was to emphasize the human rights monitoring that the 
government was supporting.  As the Prime Minister put it: ‘we write down what has been done so 
that no matter how long it takes, people should always remember that international law has got a 
long reach and a long memory’.142  Predictably, this found support among human rights and R2P 
advocacy groups, but also in the wider discourse.143  
 
This then was the position of the government at the onset of the chemical weapons crisis that 
culminated in the vote in Parliament in August 2013.  The government had consistently argued 
that the removal of Assad was consistent with UK values and UK interests.  Its discursive strategy 
had relied on an argument that the fall of the regime was inevitable and when the plausibility of 
this argument was challenged the government responded to the doubters by arguing that the UK 
was leading efforts to support the opposition as they tried to overthrow the regime.  This strategy 
had been working within the boundaries of what we have called the ‘Syria is not Libya’ discourse, 
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which limited the ability of the government to close the plausibility gap by arguing for a Libya-like 
military intervention or arming the rebel groups whose ability and character was questioned from 
2012 onwards.  These boundaries were reinforced by the sense that the White House was opposed 
to deeper involvement in the conflict.  This is why the President’s August 2012 statement that the 
regime’s use of chemical weapons would be a ‘red line’ was so significant.144  When a year later it 
was reported that the regime had used chemical weapons on a massive scale, it seemed to offer an 
unmissable opportunity to construct an argument for military intervention.  It seemed possible, in 
other words, to close the gap between stated ends and available means.     
 
As we know, Parliament rejected the government argument for force and the reasons for that are 
covered in the existing literature.  However, two points are worth mentioning to complete our 
analysis.  The first is that the vote illustrated the significance of the ‘Syria is potentially another 
Iraq’ sub-discourse (see Table 1), as well as the failure of the government’s discursive strategy to 
counteract that.  Indeed, the government was easily portrayed as rushing to support the US 
President, as prejudging the evidence of UN weapons inspectors, of failing to command consensus 
at the UN Security Council, relying on questionable (if not ‘dodgy’) intelligence reports and 
contested legal advice.  By helping to create this sense of ‘deja vu’, the government’s discursive 
strategy failed to sell policy.145  Cameron was again represented as the ‘heir to Blair’ and ‘Syria’ was 
easily framed as ‘another Iraq’, which the Prime Minister acknowledged after the vote.146  This 
framing, together with concerns that that the removal of Assad would only benefit extremist 
forces, made a military response politically impossible.   
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The second point is perhaps less obvious, and this relates to how the insistence on removing Assad 
influenced the vote.  The government in fact argued in Parliament that force would be used for 
the limited purpose of punishing the use of chemical weapons and not to overthrow the regime.  
This was an articulation of a values-based interest, (upholding the chemical weapons taboo) but it 
was separate to, and complicated by, the government’s longstanding commitment to overthrowing 
Assad.  There was support in Parliament for the government’s proposal of limited strikes but it 
was dismissed as ‘tosh’ by others.147  The argument for limited force, in other words, was simply 
not trusted in the context of broader policy and the insistence that Assad must go.  The concern 
was that the government had changed its justification for intervention but not its end goal.148  The 
argument that the government had gone beyond the UN mandate on Libya exacerbated this 
concern (another aspect of the changing meaning of ‘Libya’).  The government in this sense was a 
victim of its own success.  Its discursive strategy of linking values and interests to legitimise its 
support for the removal of Assad was so convincing that Parliament did not believe the 
government would restrain itself after Parliament authorised the use of force.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Syria crisis highlights issues that are at the core of what it means to be a liberal democratic 
state in international society.  Whether that state has a responsibility to support democratic 
revolutions and defend the human rights of foreigners has traditionally divided these states along 
the liberal / conservative faultline that we describe in this paper.  After the Iraq War, and in the 
context of economic austerity, the Cameron-led government addressed foreign policy issues with 
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a ‘Conservative accent’,149 but it was never willing or able (given the significance of liberal inspired 
discourses) to follow an ideal-type conservative realist policy.  The need to legitimate a conservative 
foreign policy through discursive strategies that also resonated with a deeply embedded liberal 
tradition had been anticipated by the articulation of ‘liberal conservativism’.  This attempt to 
articulate a via media between ideal-types also characterises the government’s discursive strategy on 
Syria.  The calls for Assad to go resonated with liberals, but by ruling out intervention the 
government mollified conservative concerns.   
 
A difficulty of holding the centre ground of course is that one can be attacked by both sides.  It 
appears in this instance, however, that the government’s strategy to legitimise a centrist approach 
found support in non-official discourse.  Indeed, when the government tried to follow through on 
its liberal rhetoric by arming the Syrian opposition and by launching air strikes, its arguments were 
less well-received.  It was checked by conservative realists and the political strength they drew from 
sub-discourses that spoke to the public’s concern that ‘Syria was not Libya’ or that ‘Syria was 
another Iraq’, as well as concerns about the coherence and character of the Syrian opposition.  
Likewise, it was politically impossible to argue that Assad might stay given the strength of the 
liberal argument and the support it drew from appeals to the ‘Arab Spring’ and the ‘R2P/ICC’ 
sub-discourse.  Realists and liberals will argue the merits of policy and as noted, the first phase of 
historiographical debate has begun.  That debate will likely centre on an approach that failed to 
match the ends and means of policy.  Our paper explains the discursive context to that failure and 
the way in which it both enabled the government and limited it to the pursuit half-measures.          
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